Opinion: Judicial Appointment Commission and the Basic Structure Test- A Fear that Never Was

Post from Harish Choudhary, IV Year Student, National Law University, Delhi and Chief Editor of Journal of National Law University, Delhi.

Judicial Appointment Commission and the Basic Structure Test: A Fear that never was

In this post, I seek to review one of the changes made by the Constitution (121^st Amendment) Bill, 2014 in furtherance of Constitution (120^th Amendment) Bill, 2013 viz. incorporation of composition of Judicial Appointment Commission (JAC) in the Constitutional Bill itself and deletion of the same from the statutory Bill. Before going into the merits of the argument, it is imperative to first address the history of the same.

Composition of JAC: A Journey from Ordinary Bill to Constitutional Bill

The Constitution (120^th Amendment) Bill, 2013 and Judicial Appointment Commission, Bill 2013 were introduced in the Rajya Sabha in August, 2013 which sought to replace the collegium system of appointment of judges in higher judiciary with that of Judicial Appointment Commission.

As per the proposed constitutional provisions – Articles 124 and 124A – JAC is to make recommendations for appointment of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. The Constitutional Bill left it for the Parliament to make law regarding composition and functions of JAC. To this end, the JAC Bill, 2013 was introduced in the Parliament. As far as the composition of JAC is concerned, the Bill maintained equal number of judicial and non-judicial members ensuring equal participation of both judiciary and executive while recommending names for the post of Judge in Supreme Court and High Courts. The move was based on the touchstone of judicial independence and system of checks and balances in our Constitution.

As happens with every proposed law, the JAC Bill was accompanied with some ambiguities, which needed to be clarified. Accordingly, it was referred to the Standing Committee for review. One of the several recommendations of the Committee was that the composition of JAC should be prescribed in the Constitution itself instead of in a statute. However, the procedure to be followed by JAC may be determined by a statute.

Standing Committee submitted two-pronged reason for this suggestion: firstly, if the composition is prescribed in the Constitution itself, in order to alter the same, Parliament has to undergo a rigorous procedure under Article 368 viz. (1) enactment by a super-majority of both houses of India’s Parliament (at present, the Constitution Amendment Bill has only been passed by the upper house); (2) ratification by the legislatures of half the states in India; and (3) assent by the President. On the other hand, amendment in an ordinary statute can be made by a simple majority in the Parliament. Standing Committee feared that if the composition is provided in an ordinary statute (JAC Bill), it can be altered at the whims and fancies of the then government. And, there will not be any check over such an action.

With this, I move on to the second prong of the reason behind the suggestion of constitutional retrenchment of composition of JAC.

Standing Committee relied on position of law that ordinarily, grounds of testing vires of a legislation is whether the legislature has legislative competence or whether the legislation is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. It was under an impression that hypothetically, in future, there is an amendment in JAC Act, if enacted, seeking four non-judicial members and three judicial members in JAC. Such an amendment would tilt the balance of equal participation of judicial and non-judicial members in the appointment process. It would, therefore, affect the judicial independence & the system of checks and balances. Unfortunately, the amendment cannot be avoided as it does not fit in the abovementioned grounds of attack of an ordinary statute. However, if the composition is provided in the Constitution itself, and any such amendment is made, it can be struck down for violating basic structure doctrine (Judicial independence, and checks & balances being part of basic structure). As per Standing Committee’s anticipation, the ground of basic structure violation is not available for review of an ordinary statute. In this context (in the next part of the post), it is submitted that the basic structure doctrine can be applied to both constitutional and statutory provisions.

Coming back to the history of the Bills, irrespective of the recommendations of Standing Committee, the Constitutional Amendment Bill was passed by the Rajya Sabha. However, it lapsed with dissolution of the 15^th Lok Sabha. Subsequently, the JAC Bill, 2013 was withdrawn on August 11, 2014.

Later on, on August 11, 2014,  the Constitution (121^st Amendment) Bill, 2014 and the National Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) Bill, 2014 – incorporating some of recommendations of Standing Committee – were introduced in the Rajya Sabha in this regard only. Interestingly, the new set of Bills prescribes the composition of JAC in the Constitutional Bill only.

Ordinary Statute and Basic Structure Test

Supreme Court faced the issue whether basic structure doctrine is applicable on statutory provision for the first time in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain. The Court decided by majority (3:1) that basic structure is applied to determine validity of constitutional provisions only – not statutory provisions. The judgement was consistently followed in a catena of cases.[1] Nevertheless, Supreme Court struck down statutory provisions in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India – Section 28 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and Sections 3, 4, 6 of Kerala State Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments or Post in the Services under the State) Act, 1995 respectively – on the basis of violation of basic structure of the Constitution.

Recently, constitution bench in K.T. Plantations & Anr v. State of Karnataka[2] has digressed from the majority opinion in Raj Narain case and has seconded the dissenting opinion of Beg J. Notably, K.T. Plantations did not follow the reasoning of Beg J. who – referring to Kelsen’s theory of law – stated that a law (ordinary statute) being subordinate to grundnorm (basic structure) cannot go beyond it.[3]  On the other hand, in K.T. Plantations reliance was placed on two Canadian Supreme Court cases[4] and it was viewed that “Courts in Canada exclusively rejected the notion that only “provisions” of the Constitution can be used to strike down legislation and comes down squarely in favour of the proposition that the rule of law [as basic structural imperatives of the Constitution] binds legislatures as well as governments.”[5]

Conclusion

In sum, it can be safely stated that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done even indirectly. It is, therefore, submitted that while prescribing composition of JAC in the Constitutional Bill, the Parliament acted – though in bona fide manner –  but in pursuance of a bogus fear. Arguably, even ordinary statute can be tested against the basic structure doctrine.

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[1] State of Karnataka v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 68; State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co. and ors., AIR 1996 SC 1627; Public Services Tribunal Bar Association v. State of U.P. and anr., AIR 2003 SC 1115; Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, AIR 2006 SC 3127.

[2] AIR 2011 SC 3430.

[3] Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 1590, ¶394 (Beg J).

[4] In Re: Resolution to Amend the Constitution, (1981) 1 SCR 753; OPSEU v. Ontario, (A.G.) (1987) 2 SCR 2.

[5] K.T. Plantations & Anr v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2011 SC 3430, ¶139.

Validity of Gift when the Donor keeps possession

Renikuntla Rajamma by LRs v. K. Sarwanamma [Civil Appeal No. 4195 OF 2008] Full Bench

I. Facts

The plaintiff (respondent in this appeal) sought a declaration that the revocation deed executed by the defendant-appellant revoking a gift deed earlier executed by her, was null and void. It is important to note that the donee defendant in the present case had reserved to herself during life, the right to enjoy the benefits arising from the suit property.

The Trial Court on the issue of gift deed being marred by fraud or undue influence found that the defendant had failed to prove such and also held that the deed was not a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to trial Court, had been validly made and accepted by the plaintiff, hence, irrevocable in nature. Moreover, since the donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, mis-representation or suspicion. The fact that the donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the deed, the trial Court opined.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the view taken by the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had satisfactorily proved the execution of a valid gift in his favour and that the revocation of a validly made gift deed was legally impermissible.

The Second Appellate Court, i.e., the High Court, also declined to interfere with the judgments and orders impugned before it and dismissed the second appeal of the appellant.

II. Issue

The only question which was urged on behalf of the appellant was whether retention of possession of the gifted property for enjoyment by the donor during her life time and the right to receive the rents of the property in any way affected the validity of the gift.

III. Relevant Provisions

§  S. 122. “Gift” defined- "Gift" is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donor, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Acceptance when to be made-Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.

§  S. 123. Transfer how effected – For the making of a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered.

§  S. 129. Saving of donations mortis causa and Muhammadan Law- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law or, save as provided by section 123, any rule of Hindu or Buddhist law”

Post 1929 Amendment

§  S. 129 Saving of donations mortis causa and Mohammedan Law- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammedan law.

IV. Contentions

§  IVa. Appellant's Contention

A conditional gift was not envisaged by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, so inasmuch as the gift deed failed to transfer, title, possession and the right to deal with the property in absolute terms in favour of the donee the same was no gift in the eyes of law. [Reiance being placed on Naramadaben Maganlal (supra).

§  IVb. Respondent's Contention

Placing reliance on K. Balakrishnan (supra), it was contended that gift which reserved a life interest for the donor could not be said to be invalid.

V. Judgment on the Issue

The Court adopted two different ways (Independent) to address the issue:

§  Va. Conjoint Reading of §§ 122 and 123 TPA and § 129 TPA

By doing so, the Court held that the “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act 1882.

The Court approved the decision of Constitution Bench of Allahabad High Court in Lallu Singh v. Gur Narain and Ors. [AIR 1922 All. 467], where the Court rejected the contention that § 123 of the T.P. Act merely added one more requirement of law namely requirement of attestation and registration of a gift deed to what was already required by the Hindu Law, i.e., making the delivery of possession absolutely essential for the completion of the gift.

§ 129 TPA: Both before and after 1929 Amendment

The Court held that a plain reading of the above made it manifest that the “rules of Hindu law” and “Buddhist Law” were to remain unaffected by Chapter VII except to the extent such rules were in conflict with § 123 of the TPA. This clearly implied that § 123 had an overriding effect on the rules of Hindu Law pertaining to gift including the rule that required possession of the property gifted to be given to the donee.

Post- amendment, the Hindu uncodified law relating to gifts apart from § 123, is now even superseded by the whole Chapter VII.

Supplementary Reasoning

§  Vb. Division of § 123 in Two Parts

The Court noted that while the first part dealing with immovable property mandatorily requires transfer by a registered instrument, the second part dealing with movable property requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”.

Therefore, 'delivery' is not even a criteria in gifting a immovable property and not a mandatory criteria, rather is an alternative in gifting a movable property.

VI. Judgment on the Conflicting Decisions [Unclear Analysis by the Court]

It was found that there is an apparent conflict between Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker v. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker & Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 255 and K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 581, thus leading to this reference to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement as to the true and correct interpretation of Sections 122 and 123 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court distinguished the judgment in the case of Naramadaben Maganlal (supra) on the facts in that case, since it was a conditional gift and there was no recital of acceptance or any evidence in proof of acceptance on the part of the donee. However, it is submitted that the Court in the present case erred in not explaining why the Gift in Naramadaben case was a conditional gift, and not in the present case as the following recitals of the deed in Naramadaben case show that there the stipulations made on the gift deed were same as to be addressed by the present case, i.e., enjoyment of the property by the donor till his/her lifetime and right to receive rent. Apart from a clear finding of acceptance by the donee in the present case, the judgment in the Naramadaben case conflicts with the judgment in the present case.

In that case the donor that gifted the property stating:

"The said immovable property as described above with the ground floor and with the ways to pass and with the water disposal and with all other concerned rights, titles is gifted to you and the possession whereof is handed over to you under the following conditions to be observed by you and your heirs and legal representatives as long as the Sun and the Moon shine…that and you are made owners by the gift deed of the said property on such conditions that there are 15 rooms on the said property at present. I am rightful to receive the rents and the mesne profit whatsoever accrued from the said rooms throughout my life. I am only entitled to receive the mesne profit of the said property till I live. Similarly the said property shall be in my possession till I live…And by this gift deed the Limited ownership right will be conferred to you till I live. After my death you are entitled to transfer the said property. I shall not give in any way my right to anybody to collect the mesne profit. You may get transferred the said property in your name in support of this deed. This gift deed is executed to you under the aforesaid conditions."

Then, the deed was cancelled stating that:

"I executed to you a conditional gift deed of the said property from sky to earth. You had promised me to fulfill the oral conditions between us. But immediately after making the gift accordingly, you denied to fulfill the said conditions, The possession of the gifted property is not handed over to you. So in fact, you have not accepted the conditional gift of the property and I am also not willing to act according to the conditional gift."

The Court approved the judgment of K. Balakrishnan (supra), where the Court held had held that there is no prohibition in law that ownership in a property cannot be gifted without its possession and right of enjoyment.

VII. Conclusion

The Court, while approving the dictum that where the terms of a Statute or Ordinance are clear, then even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, held that (i) whenever the donor is in absolute ownership of the property, (ii)

and transfers absolute title in the gift to the donee, (iii) which the donee accepts, and (iv) the acceptance of which is in the lifetime of donor, then, the mere fact of retaining the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor, does not affect the transfer of ownership in the favor of the donee.

In the effect, if the donor does not give possession of the property to the donee till he/she is alive and even collects rents till his/her lifetime, such stipulations do not make the gift conditional. Therefore, it is a valid gift and consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Analyzing the CoalGate Judgment: Part 2

In the previous post, the background, relevant of provisions and the contentions of the Counsels were dealt with. In this part, the judgment of the Court is discussed in six sub- parts or issues.

V. Judgment

Va. Judgment on the issue of Central Government’s Legislative Power to allocate Coal Blocks

The Court held that the power in relation to the mines and minerals was accorded to both, Centre and States. The State Governments in terms of List I Entry 54 and List II Entry 23 enjoy the power to enact legislation on the topics of “mines and minerals development”, with the only fetter imposed on the State Legislatures under Entry 23 is by the latter part of the said entry which says, “subject to the provisions of List I with respect to

Regulation and development under the control of the Union”.[1]

Therefore, the legal regime relating to Regulation of mines and development of minerals is, thus, guided by the 1957 Act and the 1960 Rules under the power of the Union. The Court held that in pursuance of the two declarations, i.e., Section 2 of the 1957 Act and Section 1A of the CMN Act, the States have lost their jurisdiction to legislate to the extent to which the Union had taken over control, Regulation and development of coal mines.[2]

The Court held that the purpose of CMN Act is to place an embargo on granting the leases for winning or mining of coal to persons other than those mentioned in Section 3(3)(a). In other words, with regard to the matters falling under the 1957 Act, the legal regime in the 1957 Act is made subject to the prescription Under Section 3(3)(a) and (c) of the CMN Act. For grant of reconnaissance permit, prospecting licence or mining lease in respect of coal mines, the MMDR regime has to be mandatorily followed. 1957 Act and so also the 1960 Rules do not provide for allocation of coal blocks nor they provide any mechanism, mode or manner of such allocation.[3] The Court further held that the CMN Act, as amended from time to time, does not have any provision, direct or indirect, for allocation of coal blocks and there are no rules framed by the Central Government nor is there any notification issued by it under the CMN Act providing for allocation of coal blocks by it first and then consideration of an application of such allottee for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease by the State Government.[4]

The Court also held that in its view, the source of power of the Central Government in allocation of coal blocks is not dependant on the understanding of the State Governments but it is dependant upon whether such power exists in law or not.[5]

Vb. Judgment on the issue of Right Created by the Allocation Letter

The Court held that the allocation letter is not merely an identification exercise as is sought to be made by the AG, which in its own opinion creates and confers a very valuable right upon the allottee. According to it, the allocation letter by the Central Government leaves practically or apparently nothing for the State Government to decide save and except to carry out the formality of processing the application and for execution of the lease deed with the beneficiary selected by the Central Government.[6]
The Court opined that while it is true that allocation letter by itself does not authorize the allottee to win or mine the coal but nevertheless the allocation letter does confer a very important right upon the allottee to apply for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease.[7]
The allocation of coal block is not simply identification of the coal block or the allocatee but it is in fact selection of beneficiary.[8] The Court rejected the submission of Mr. Salve that the additional declaration Under Section 1A of the CMN Act seeks to do away with any vestige of power in the State in the matter of selection of beneficiaries of the mineral on the ground that had it been so, Rule 35 of the 1960 Rules would not have been amended to provide that where two or more persons have applied for reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence or a mining lease in respect of the same land, the State Government shall, consider the end-use of the mineral by the applicant.

The Court alone on the above two issues could declare that the allocations are bad in law. But treading cautiously, it also went on to check the Constitutionality of the Allocation process. It is here that the process of allocation gets murkier and horribly opaque.

Vc. Judgment on the issue as to whether ‘Public Auction’ is the only Constitutional process.

The Court while clarifying that the State is duty bound to adopt the method of auction, was confined to the specific case of spectrum and not for dispensation of all natural resources, held that there is no constitutional mandate in favour of auction under Article 14.[9] It further held that merely because methods other than auction are susceptible to abuse, such cannot be the basis for striking down the method as ultra vires the Constitution.[10]

Vd. Judgment on the issue as to the Scope of Court’s interference on the method of distribution adopted.

The Court held that this Court cannot conduct a comparative study of the various methods of distribution of natural resources and suggest the most efficacious mode, if there is one universal efficacious method in the first place and it respects the mandate and wisdom of the executive for such matters, since they are matters of economic policy.[11] It held that it cannot and will not compare which policy is fairer than the other. However, the Court would interfere when such a policy decision is not backed by a social or welfare purpose, and precious and scarce natural resources are alienated for commercial pursuits of profit maximising private entrepreneurs, adoption of means other than those that are competitive and maximise revenue may be arbitrary and face the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Ve. Judgment on the issue of Constitutionality of ‘Not using Open Bidding Process’

The explanation by the Central Government for not adopting the competitive bidding is that coal is a natural resource used as a raw material in several basic industries like power generation, iron and steel and cement. The end products of these basic industries are, in turn, used as inputs in almost all manufacturing and infrastructure development industries. Therefore, the price of coal occupies a fundamental place in the growth of the economy and any increase in the input price would have a cascading effect.

It is important to note that the Court did not strike the allocations made on the ground that

“competitive bidding would have brought in transparency, objectivity and very importantly given a level playing field to all applicants of coal and lowered the difference between the market price of coal and the cost of coal for the allottee by way of premium which would have accrued to the Government.”

The Court held that

“[it] cannot conduct a comparative study of various methods of distribution of natural resources and cannot mandate one method to be followed in all facts and circumstances, then if the grave situation of shortage of power prevailing at that time necessitated private participation and the Government felt that it would have been impractical and unrealistic to allocate coal blocks through auction and later on in 2004 or so there was serious opposition by many State Governments to bidding system, and the Government did not pursue competitive bidding/public auction route, then in our view, the administrative decision of the Government not to pursue competitive bidding cannot be said to be so arbitrary or unreasonable warranting judicial interference.”[12]

Vf. Judgment on the issue of Constitutionality of using Screening Method for Allocation

The Court categorically stated:

“if the allocation of subject coal blocks is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution and the procedure that has been followed in such allocation is found to be unfair, unreasonable, discriminatory, nontransparent, capricious or suffers from favoritism or nepotism and violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, the consequences of such unconstitutional or illegal allocation must follow.”[13]

Here, the Court found that:

(a) the entire process suffers from the vice of arbitrariness and not following any objective criteria in determining as to who is to be selected or who is not to be selected. There is no evaluation of merit and no inter se comparison of the applicants. No chart of evaluation was prepared. The determination of the Screening Committee is apparently subjective as the minutes of the Screening Committee meetings do not show that selection was made after proper assessment.

(b) By virtue of the bar contained in Section 3(3) of the CMN Act, between 1976 and 1993, no private company (other than the company engaged in the production of iron and steel) could have carried out coal mining operations in India.

Section 3(3) of the CMN Act, which was amended on 09.06.1993 permitted private sector entry in coal mining operations for captive use. The power for grant of captive coal block is governed by Section 3(3)(a) of the CMN Act, according to which, only two kind of entities, namely, (a) Central Government or undertakings/corporations owned by the Central Government; or (b) companies having end-use plants in iron and steel, power, washing of coal or cement can carry out coal mining operations.

The prospective engagement by a private company in the production of steel, power or cement would not entitle such private company to carry out coal mining operation. Most of the companies, which have been allocated coal blocks, were not engaged in the production of steel, power or cement at the time of allocation nor in the applications made by them any disclosure was made whether or not the power, steel or cement plant was operational. They only stated that they proposed to set up such plants. Thus, the requirement of end-use project was not met at the time of allocation.

(c) Moreover, the recommendation by Screening Committee of allocating coal blocks to 29 State Government PSUs, while through the Government dispensation route, allocation has been recommended for 72 PSUs. The Government dispensation route is when allocations were made by the Ministry of Coal to the Government companies. The court held that in light of the provisions of the CMN Act, as amended in 1976, the State Government or State PSUs are not allowed to mine coal for commercial use.[14]

(d) Worsening the situation is when the State PSUs, besides having been allocated coal mines for commercial purpose, had also been allowed to form joint venture companies, i.e., 51% shareholding of State PSUs and 49% of private company. However, in the joint venture agreements between the State PSUs and the private companies, mining operations have been given to private company, which the Court holds has “virtually defeated the legislative policy in the CMN Act and winning and mining of coal mines has resultantly gone in the hands of private companies for commercial use.”[15]

(e) Many of the companies selected by the Screening Committee had no recommendation from the State Government or from the Ministry of Power and CEA and some of them had no recommendation either from the State Government or the Ministry of Power and CEA at all. For example, for Durgapur-II/Taraimar, the selected company Balco had no recommendation at all from the State Government, Ministry of Power and CEA.[16]

(f) The Screening Committee did not assess the capacities and coal requirement of the companies, for instance in 26^th meeting, where it decided that detailed formulation of groups or 'common pool' for allocation of coal/blocks in line with the dispensation being contemplated in MCL blocks will be worked out by the Ministry of Coal. The Court held that the expression 'a company' occurring in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the CMN Act does not cover "consortium of companies" or "formulation of groups" or "common pool". The decision of the Screening Committee to recommend allocation of coal blocks to consortium of companies or formulation of groups or common pool is in contravention of Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the CMN Act.[17]

In conclusion, the Screening Committee has never been consistent, it has not been transparent, there is no proper application of mind, it has acted on no material in many cases, relevant factors have seldom been its guiding factors, there was no transparency and guidelines have seldom guided it.

The allocation of coal blocks through Government dispensation route, however laudable the object may be, also is illegal since it is impermissible as per the scheme of the CMN Act. No State Government or public sector undertakings of the State Governments are eligible for mining coal for commercial use. Equally, there is also no question of any consortium/leader/association in allocation.

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[1] Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (2012) 11 SCC 1,¶ 130

[2] CoalGate Judgment ¶¶ 50-56; Baijnath Kadio v. State of Bihar (1969) 3 SCC 838; Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1961 SC 459; State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch and Co. AIR 1964 SC 1284; Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2010) 13 SCC 1, State of Assam v. Om Prakash Mehta (1973) 1 SCC 584; Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. (2012) 11 SCC 1,

[3] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 57.

[4] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 58

[5] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 59.

[6] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 61.

[7] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 70.

[8] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 64.

[9] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 94; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1, ¶¶ 129- 131.

[10] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 95; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 135.

[11] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 96; Natural Resources Allocation, In Re Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1, ¶ 146.

[12] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 105.

[13] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 105.

[14] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 153.

[15] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 153.

[16] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 148.

[17] CoalGate Judgment ¶ 138.