Monday, 6 October 2014

Opinion: State Dinners & Summons- Mr. Modi's Trip to New York

Post from Kanwar Vivswan, IV Year Student, National Law University, Delhi.
Kanwar Vivswan (member team, runners up at North India Rounds Stetson International Environment Law Moot) has an avid interest in International Law and is giving his opinion on what could be the legal position in the present case where summons have been issued against the Indian PM Narendra Modi during his visit to US as a State Guest.


Background

In 2005, the United States denied Mr. Modi a visa whilst he was Chief Minister of Gujarat. Today, Mr. Modi, as the Prime Minister of India, being a state guest of the United State of America still faces challenges in the land of the free. Amidst the preparations for the Indian PM's visit, news reports came that a New York federal District Court has issued summons to Mr. Modi on 25th September, 2014. The summons were issued pursuant to a complaint by the American Justice Centre [AJC], an American NGO, that sought compensatory and punitive damages for “crimes against humanity; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; extrajudicial killing; wrongful deaths; negligence; public nuisance; battery; and intentional infliction of emotional distress” allegedly perpetrated by Mr. Modi.[1]
The complainant states that under international law, Mr. Modi can be prosecuted for the said crimes in the US under the principle of universal jurisdiction, whereby a state may exercise jurisdiction over serious crimes (such as genocide, torture and war crimes) even if there exists no connection, based on territory or nationality.[2]
 In this post it will be argued that the complainant has failed to establish in the lawsuit whether civil universal jurisdiction (under which damages are being claimed in this case) has the same scope as criminal jurisdiction in enforcing these international law norms. In this regard, we argue that the summons against Mr. Modi is not sustainable under international law because of the following reasons:


A. Alien Tort Statute
The present suit has been filed under the Alien Torts Statute [ATS] which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”[3] Passed as a part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS in the early 1980s was read by the US courts to cover cases involving violations of universally recognized obligatory norms of international law.[4] The United States Supreme Court recently reexamined the ATS in Kiobel.[5] Noting that all laws had a presumption against extra-territoriality,[6]the Court concluded after looking at the history[7] and text of the statute,[8] that there exists no evidence to rebut that presumption in the case of the ATS.[9]The ATS was enacted for protection against three primary offences as identified by Blackstone: the violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.[10] The negative policy implications of extra-territorial application of the ATS was highlighted by states such as UK, Australia and Switzerland who cautioned that broad assertions of extra-territorial jurisdiction under ATS would expose foreign nationals to uncertain and costly proceedings in foreign courts.[11]
Some believe that universal civil jurisdiction may become a rule of customary international law in due course of time. But it has not yet done so and therefore cannot be accorded the same status as universal criminal jurisdiction. Hence, Mr. Modi can’t be prosecuted under the ATS.




B. Torture Victim Protection Act
The complainant has also claimed jurisdiction under the Torture Victim Protection Act [TVP Act]. The TVP Act was enacted in 1992 shortly after the ATS. It provides civil remedies only for two international law torts viz. torture and extra judicial killings. The United States enacted this law in order to fulfill its obligations under the Convention against Torture which requires states to prosecute suspected torturers found within their territory. The TVP Act allows for exercise of jurisdiction without the traditional requirement of proving a nexus with the United States.
The application of the TVP Act would be untenable in this case. The Act clearly requires that first, the suit should not be time barred and secondly, the complainant must exhaust local remedies before pursuing a suit in U.S. courts. In the instant case both these requirements have not been fulfilled.
The complaint concerns the role of Mr. Modi in 2002 riots whereas they have brought forth the complaint after 12 years, in September, 2014.  The suit is time barred and hence not maintainable because the TVP Act explicitly provides that-“No action shall be maintained under this section unless it is commenced within 10 years after the cause of action arose.”[12]
On the second point the relevant provision of the Act states that:
A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.[13]

It is to be noted that the Special Investigation Team which was constituted by the Supreme Court of India, had concluded that it had not found sufficient evidence to justify placing Modi on trial. Zakia Jaffri a long standing activist, who lost her husband in the riots, placed an application before the Gujarat High Court protesting the conclusions made by the report as well as its validity. The matter remains sub-judice. Therefore, the available remedies in the place in which the conduct has occurred have not been satisfied.


C. Immunity as a UN Delegate
Section 11(a) of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations makes it clear that while performing mandated functions and during the journey to and from the place of meeting, the representatives of members to the UN shall enjoy immunity from legal process of every kind including arrest or detention. Section 14 of the convention explains that the rationale behind such immunity; is to safeguard the independent exercise of the functions of representatives. Therefore, Mr. Modi being a delegate of a member state of the UN will be cloaked under this convention’s immunity. The United States Government confirmed its commitment to this stance, when it said that delegates to the UN General Assembly enjoy immunity while in New York to attend the UN event.[14]



D.  Immunity as a State Head
Immunity from prosecution is available to heads of states under customary international law. There are two types of immunities available: ratione personae and ratione materiae. Ratione personae provides civil and criminal immunity to heads of state for acts done in both, a private as well as official capacity.[15]It is available irrespective of whether the acts were performed before or during the term of office. Since ratione personae is based on the office of the individual concerned, it is only available for the duration of the individual holding office. Whereas, in case of ratione materiae, immunity the protection is available even after the person ceases to perform acts of the state provided that the acts were done in an official capacity. The implication of this is that even when an individual ceases to hold a post he loses his immunity ratione personae but is still protected under the ratione materiae immunity. However, it is to be noted that there has been an evolving rule of customary international law that excludes the application of ratione materiae in the case of international crimes.[16]
As was noted by the ICJ in its decision in Yeodia/Arrest Warrants,[17] heads of state enjoy personal immunity from being tried in foreign courts on the ground that the immunity ratione personae bars all criminal and civil proceedings. Further, there is a general acceptance that the heads of the governments also enjoy the same kind of immunity as the head of the states..[18] Therefore, the summons is in violation of Mr. Modi’s ratione personae immunity.[19]


Conclusion
In our opinion, the issuance of the summons by the Federal Court of New York is not only sans jurisdiction, but also precluded by the immunities afforded to Mr. Modi. However, the summons and its accompanying rejection by the United States Government, is particularly interesting considering the United States in 2005 denied Mr. Modi a visa on similar grounds. This entire episode sheds light upon the pressures of international relations, and how international relations interact with international law.


The author would like to thank Sanjeevi Seshadri, his batchmate, for giving his invaluable insights on the topic.


[1]http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/us-federal-court-issues-summons-against-narendra-modi/
[2] http://www.thehindu.com/multimedia/archive/02126/Class_lawsuit_agai_2126838a.pdf
[3]28 U.S.C. § 1350
[4]Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
[5] 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013)
[6]P.2, Supra 5.
[7]P.8, Supra 5.
[8]P.9, Supra 5.
[9] P.4,P.13,Supra 5.
[10]P.8 Supra 5.
[11]Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain542 U.S. 692 (2004).
[12]§ 2(c)28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
[13]§ 2(b)28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
[14] http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140927/jsp/frontpage/story_18878344.jsp#.VC6MZmeSw7U
[15] Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26
[16] Prosecutor v. Al Bashir (PTC Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute) ICC-02/05-01/0 9 (12
December 2011).
[17] 2002 I.C.J. 3
[18] Jones v Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26
[19] http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140927/jsp/frontpage/story_18878344.jsp#.VC6MZmeSw7U

Sunday, 5 October 2014

Ascertaining the Jurisdiction of Magistracy Court in Cases of Cheque Bouncing

Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra[1] [Full Bench]

Background of the Case
In the case of K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, the Supreme Court in a division bench had held that an offence under Section 138 (a penal provision dealing with cases of cheque bouncing) can be completed only with the occurrence of all the 5 following elements: (a) Drawing of the cheque, (2) then presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) thereafter return of the cheque as unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) consequently giving of a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, and finally (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.
Now, the consequence of the decision was that the holder of the cheques (i.e., the person to whom the cheque is issued or person entitled to be paid) after getting the cheque dishonoured would initiate litigation at any place suitable to his/her own convenience [sometimes to even cause harassment to the accused], not necessarily a place convenient to the accused. Since, there were 5 ingredients of the offence as per Bhaskaran, therefore, the case can be instituted in the territoriality of any Court at whose place any of the ingredients occurred or one of the “cause of action” arose.

I. Precedents Involved
The precedents cited that are overruled, clarified or upheld:
(a)   K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan (1999) 7 SCC 510 [Division Bench]
(b)  Harman Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 720 [Division Bench]
(c)   Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 [Full Bench]
(d)  Prem Chand Vijay Kumar v. Yashpal Singh (2005) 4 SCC 417 [Division Bench]
(e)   SIL Import, USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters (1999) 4 SCC 567 [Division Bench]
(f)   Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd. (2006) 3 SCC 658 [Division Bench]
(g)   Nishant Aggarwal v. Kailash Kumar Sharma decided on 1.7.2013 Criminal Appeal No. 808 of 2013 [Division Bench]
(h)  Escorts Limited v. Rama Mukherjee decided on 17.09.2013 Criminal Appeal No. 1457 of 2013 [Division Bench]


II. Relevant Provisions
Ø  Negotiable Instruments Act 1882

§  Section 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

§  Section 142. Cognizance of offences- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) -
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable Under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;
(b) Such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises Under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138; Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.
(c) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable Under Section 138.

Ø  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

§  Section 177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial.- Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

§  Section 178. Place of inquiry or trial. -(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

§  Section 179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues.-When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensued.


III. Issues
1.   Whether the offence u/s 138 NI Act is complete when the cheque is dishonoured or when the drawer fails to make the payment even after receipt of notice informing about the return of the cheque by drawee unpaid. In other words, whether the offence is complete when the main text of provision of Section 138 NI Act is satisfied, or when the Provisos to the Section 138 of the NI Act are fulfilled.
2.    Whether for the purposes of Court’s jurisdiction, Section 177 CrPC or civil proceedings “cause of action” operates.
3.    Whether the jurisdiction is of the Court in whose territoriality the bank on whom the cheque is drawn is situated or jurisdiction is on all those Courts in whose territoriality incidents of (a) drawing of the cheque, (b) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (c) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (d) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (e) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, may have occurred.
4.   On the scope of allegations of commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code and the jurisdiction of which Court thereof.


IV. Judgment on the Issues
Vikramkjit and Thakur, JJ. though wrote separate opinions, concurred on their conclusions.

On Issue 1
The Court speaking through the twin opinions of Vikramjit and Thakur, JJ. held that the Bhaskaran judgment had wrongly read the proviso to Section 138 NI Act’s main text, as prescribing the ingredients of the offence. In the Court’s opinion, the proviso instead should be treated as an exception to the generality of the enacting part by stipulating further conditions before a competent Court may take cognizance of the same.[2]
The Court opined that the legislature has made a clear distinction between what would constitute an offence and what would give to the complainant the cause of action to file a complaint for the court competent to take cognizance. Therefore, though an offence within the contemplation of Section 138 is complete with the dishonour of the cheque,[3] but taking cognizance of the same by any Court is forbidden so long as the complainant does not have the cause of action to file a complaint in terms of Clause (c) of the proviso read with Section 142.

On Issue 2
The Court while noting that Section 138 NI Act is a penal provision, stated that Sections 177 and 178 of the CrPC are the guiding provisions to be followed, which require that the Court in whose territory the offence is committed, to be the Court of jurisdiction. The usage of phrase “cause of action” in Section 142 NI Act, in the Court’s opinion, has irrelevantly led to the blind borrowing of civil law attributes in Criminal proceedings. In the Court’s opinion, the reason why Section 142 uses the phrase “cause of action” is because the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act features three factors which are additionally required for prosecution to be successful as compliance with the three factors contained in the proviso are essential for the cognizance of the offence, even though they are not part of the action constituting the crime.
In my opinion, the Court rightly notes that the CrPC under Sections 177 and 178 mandates that the place where the offence is committed is the place relevant for conducting criminal prosecution. Therefore, the concept of “cause of action” where the bundle of facts required to be proved in a suit and accordingly also being relevant for the place of suing, is not pertinent/germane for determining the territorial jurisdiction of criminal Trials.

On Issue 3
Since, as the Court has already held that the offence under Section 138 NI is committed when the cheque is dishonoured, therefore, the Criminal Prosecution logically is the place where the cheque is dishonoured as per Section 177 CrPC. Thakur, J. rightly pointed out that the confusion as to the place of commission of the offence for the purposes of Sections 177 to 179 of the CrPC is meaningless, since once it is held that the conditions precedent for taking cognizance are not the ingredients constituting the offence of dishonour of the cheque, there is no room for any such confusion or vagueness about the place where the offence is committed, i.e., the place where the cheque is dishonoured.[4]

On Issue 4
The Court envisaged the possibility of cases where the offence under Section 138 NI Act is out of the offences [like the offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing the delivery of the property] committed in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) CrPC[5]. In such cases, the offender may be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence and any such inquiry or trial may be conducted by any Court competent to enquire into or try any of the offences as provided by Section 184[6] CrPC.

V. Conclusion
The Court concluded that the offence under Section 138 NI Act is completed as soon as the cheque is dishonoured, while the prosecution is delayed till the satisfaction of the conditions mentioned in the proviso to Section 138 NI Act are fulfilled. Therefore, in light of Section 177 CrPC, the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank is located, since it is the place where the offence under Section 138 NI Act is committed.




[1] 2014 (9) SCALE 97, Decided On: 01.08.2014.
[2] Present Case, ¶¶ 16, 51.
[3] Present Case ¶¶ 8, 37, 52.
[4] Present judgment, ¶¶ 19, 52.
[5] Section 220 (1) CrPC- Trial for more than one offence- If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
[6] Relevant part of Section 184 CrPC- “where the offences committed by any person are such that he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each such offence by virtue of Section 220… [then] the offences may be inquired into or tried by any Court competent to inquire into or try any of the offences.”