Showing posts with label Property Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Property Law. Show all posts

Friday, 17 October 2014

Priority of Lien Holder's claims as against the Dues to Income Tax Authorities over the proceeds from the security deposited

The Stock Exchange v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar[1] [Full Bench]

Background of the Case
The case pertains to the Income Tax Authorities’ right to recover its dues from an assessee (defaulter declared by the Stock Exchange) by having a first claim over the amount realized by the Stock Exchange at the auction of the Membership Card of such defaulter.

I. Contentions
Ø  Appellant’s Contentions
§  That the membership card is only a personal privilege granted to a member that cannot be attached by the Income Tax Department at any stage. The moment a member is declared a defaulter all rights qua the membership card of the member cease and even his right of nomination vests in the Stock Exchange.
§  That a conjoint reading of Rules 38 with 44 of the Rules made by the Stock Exchange shows that the security in form of shares that are given by a member is transferred and held either in the name of the trustees of the Stock Exchange or in the name of a Bank which is approved by the Governing Board. Therefore, the member is no longer an owner, consequently the Income Tax Department cannot lay hands on these shares or its sale proceeds as the member ceases to have ownership rights of these shares.
§  That by virtue of Rule 43, the Stock Exchange has a first and paramount lien for any sum due to it, and that this made it a secured creditor so that in any case income tax dues would not to be given preference over dues to secured creditors.

Ø  Respondent’s Contentions
§  That the High Court’s reasoning is correct where it had held that though a defaulting member had no interest in a membership card and that the Income Tax Department was not right in attaching the sale proceeds of such card, still money which is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee, that is the Bombay Stock Exchange, for and on behalf of the Assessee is attachable because the requisite condition is the subsistence of an ascertained debt in the hands of the garnishee which is due to the Assessee, or the existence of a contractual relationship between the Assessee and the Stock Exchange consequent upon which money is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee for and on behalf of the Assessee
§  That a conjoint reading of rules made by the Stock Exchange makes it clear the expression “transferred” would not refer to transfer of ownership but would refer only to the delivery made of shares for the purpose of realization in case a member defaults.
§  That the mere fact that a lien was provided in the Rules did not make such lien a statutory lien and that therefore Government dues would have a first preference over all the dues of the Stock Exchange.



II. Relevant Provisions
Ø  Income Tax Act

§  Section 226 3 (i) The assessing officer or tax recovery officer may, at any time or from time to time, by notice in writing require any person from whom money is due or may become due to the Assessee or any person who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of the Assessee, to pay the assessing officer or tax recovery officer either forthwith upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in the notice (not being before the money becomes due or is held) so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the amount due by the Assessee in respect of arrears or the whole of the money when it is equal to or less than that amount:
§  Rule 26 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act then provides Debts and Shares, etc. - (1) In case of
(a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument… c) other movable property not in the possession of the defaulter…the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting, (i) in the case of the debt - the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the tax recovery officer…(iii) in the case of the other movable property (except as aforesaid) - the person in possession of the same from giving it over to the defaulter.


Ø  Securities Regulation Act, 1956

§  Section 9. Power of recognised stock exchanges to make bye-law(1) Any recognised stock exchange may, subject to the previous approval of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, make bye-laws for the Regulation and control of contracts.


Ø  Rules made by the Stock Exchange

§  Rule 5. Membership a Personal Privilege- The membership shall constitute a personal permission from the Exchange to exercise the rights and privileges attached thereto subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange.
§  Rule 7. Right of Nomination- Subject to the provisions of these Rules a member shall have the right of nomination, which shall be personal and non-transferable.
§  Rule 9. Right of Nomination of Deceased or Defaulter Member- On the death or default of a member his right of nomination shall cease and vest in the Exchange.
§  Rule 10. Forfeited or Lapsed Right of Membership- When a right of membership is forfeited to or vests in the Exchange under any Rule, Bye-law or Regulation of the Exchange for the time being in force it shall belong absolutely to the Exchange free of all rights, claims or interest of such member or any person claiming through such member and the Governing Board shall be entitled to deal with or dispose of such right of membership as it may think fit.
§  Rule 16. Allocation in Order of Priority- When as provided in these Rules the Governing Board has exercised the right of nomination in respect of a membership vesting in the Exchange the consideration received therefore shall be applied to the following purposes and in the following order of priority namely-…(iii) the payment of the surplus if any to the funds of the Exchange: provided that the Exchange in general meeting may at its absolute discretion direct that such surplus be disposed of or applied in such other manner as it may deem fit.
§  Rule 37. Form of Security- The security to be furnished by a member shall be provided either by a deposit of cash or it may be provided in the form of a Deposit Receipt of a Bank approved by the Governing Board or in Securities approved by the Governing Board subject to such terms and conditions as the Governing Board may from time to time impose…
§  Rule 38. Security How HeldDeposits of cash shall be lodged in a Bank approved by the Governing Board and Bank Deposit Receipts and securities shall be transferred to and held either in the names of the Trustees of the Exchange or in the name of a Bank approved by the Governing Board and lodged with a Bank approved by the Governing Board. Such deposit shall be entirely at the risk of the member providing the security but it shall be held by the Bank solely for and on account of the Exchange at the absolute discretion of the Exchange without any right whatever on the part of such member or those in his right to call in question, the exercise of such discretion.
§  Rule 41. Change of Security- A member may withdraw any security provided by him if he first provides in lieu thereof other security of sufficient value to the satisfaction of the Governing Board.
§  Rule 43. Lien on Security- The security provided by a member shall be subject to a first and paramount lien for any sum due to the Exchange or to the Clearing House by him or by the partnership of which he may be a member and for the due fulfillment of his engagements, obligations and liabilities or of the partnership of which he may be a member arising out of or incidental to any bargains, dealings, transactions and contracts made subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange or anything done in pursuance thereof.
§  Rule 44Return of Security- On the termination of his membership or on his ceasing to carry on business on the Exchange or on his working as a representative member or on his death all security not applied under the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange shall at the cost of the member be repaid and transferred either to him or as he shall direct or in the absence of such direction to his legal representatives.

Ø  Bye- Laws made by the Stock Exchange

§  Rule 326Defaulter’s Assets- The Defaulters’ Committee shall call in and realise the security and margin money and securities deposited by the defaulter and recover all monies, securities and other assets due, payable or deliverable to the defaulter by any other member in respect of any transaction or dealing made subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange and such assets shall vest in the Defaulters’ Committee for the benefit and on account of the creditor members.

III. Issues
1.     Whether the membership card is a privilege or a right for the defaulting member.
2.     Whether in the Chapter entitled ‘Membership Security’, the phrase “securities shall be transferred to and held” in Rule 38, means a mere transfer of possession of security or transfer of ownership of security. In other words, whether the security furnished by the member (in form of shares in the present case), remains in his/her ownership or the ownership rests with the person keeping the ownership.
3.     Whether the government debts have precedence over secured creditors.
4.     What is the nature of the lien under rule 43, i.e., whether it is a statutory lien or a lien under an agreement of furnishing a security.
5.     Whether the lien under Rule 43 makes make the Stock Exchange a secured creditor.


IV. Judgment on the Issues

On Issue 1
The Court held that a conjoint reading of Rules 5 and 9 leads to the conclusion that a membership card is only a personal permission from the Stock Exchange to exercise rights and privileges, which can be taken away along with the right of nomination from the defaulting member. The Court here distinguished between any accrued right to that of any privilege. In its opinion, the member only had a privilege and not an accrued right to property. The Court, by relying on the Ahmedabad Stock Exchange case[2] where it had held that the membership under the above mentioned rules is merely a personal privilege granted to a member and is non- transferrable and incapable of alienation by the member and concluded that once a right of nomination vests in the Stock Exchange under the Rules, that right belongs to the Stock Exchange absolutely.
The Court also noticed that whenever under Rule 16 (iii) the Governing Board exercises the right of nomination in respect of a membership which vests in the Exchange, the ultimate surplus that may remain after the membership card is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange - it does not go to the member. This shows that the member does not have any right to property.

On Issue 2
The Court construed the expression “securities shall be transferred to and held” so as to be providing only for transfer by delivery of security to the Stock Exchange, while the ownership still remains with the member. For that it noted, amongst other reasons, that (i) the expression “transferred” must take colour from the expression “lodged” in Rule 38 when it came to deposits of cash. So, when understood in this sense, transfer only means delivery for the purposes of holding such shares as securities, (ii) the language employed in Rule 38 states “such deposit shall be entirely at the risk of the member providing the security…”, which shows that the deposit of cash or security is entirely at the risk of the member who provides the security. Thus, making it clear that such member continues to be the owner of the said shares by way of security for otherwise they cannot possibly be at the member’s risk, (iii) Rule 41 allows a member to withdraw any security provided by him if he satisfies the conditions of the Rules, (iv) Rule 43 provides for a lien on securities to the Stock Exchange. Such a lien is only compatible with the member being owner of the security, for otherwise no question arises if the Stock exchange (as contended by ld. Counsel for appellants) is the owner of the security.

On Issue 3
The Court while noting that the Income Tax Act itself does not provide for any paramountcy of dues by way of income tax, cited with approval the judgment in the case of Dena Bank v. Bhikabhai Prabhudas Parekh Co,[3] where it was held that the common law of England or the principles of equity and good conscience (as applicable to India) do not accord the Crown a preferential right for recovery of its debts over a mortgagee or pledgee of goods or a secured creditor. Here, Article 372 of the Constitution of India is relevant where the common law of England qua Crown debts becomes applicable to our jurisdiction. In fact, in the case of Collector of Aurangabad and Anr v. Central Bank of India and Anr[4] the Court held that the claim of the Government to priority for arrears of income tax dues stems from the English common law doctrine of priority of Crown debts and has been given judicial recognition in British India prior to 1950 and was therefore “law in force” in the territory of India before the Constitution and was continued by Article 372 of the Constitution. However, such right of priority of Government dues only extends to priority over unsecured debts.

On Issue 4
The Court chose not to address the issue of whether the lien provided under the Rule 43 made by the Stock Exchange is a statutory lien or a lien under an agreement. Therefore, the Contention (iii) of the respondent’s was not relevant. The Court stated that the precedents cited by the respondent’s counsel for the proposition that the statutory lien is a paramount lien only which can override the claims of all other creditors including secured creditors, is not in issue in the present case. Since, to overrule the Income Tax Department’s decision of claiming priority of Government debt over the Stock Exchange’s claims, would only require to prove that the Stock Exchange’s claims make it a secured creditor.

On Issue 5
The Court here referred to the judgment in the case of K.S. Saradambal v. Jagannatham K Brothers[5], where on a consideration of Section 529 of the Companies Act 1956 read with the relevant provisions of the insolvency law, came to the conclusion that the holder of a statutory lien or the holder of a lien created by contract and registered as required by Section 125 is a secured creditor in the matter of winding up of the insolvent company with regard to, among other things, debts provable in the winding up proceedings.
Explaining the meaning of the term ‘lien’ which is the right to retain possession of a thing until a claim be satisfied which is either particular or general,[6] the Court noted that a secured creditor is one, who has some mortgage, charge or lien on the company’s property. Therefore, a solicitor who holds a lien on documents of a liquidating company for his costs against the company is a secured creditor, and must mention his lien in his proof.[7]
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Stock Exchange being the one holding a lien (irrespective of the fact whether it is a statutory lien or lien by agreement) is a secured creditor and consequently has higher claim over the government’s debts.

V. Conclusion
So, the Court has held that the TRO was not right in attaching the sale proceeds of the nomination rights of the Defaulter-Member’s membership card as the ownership of such nomination rights and the membership card were on default vested in the Stock Exchange and not the defaulter. Since, the membership rights were only a privilege and can be taken away, there was no accrued right to the member. Also, the surplus that may remain after the membership card is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange and does not go to the member as per Rule 16 (iii).

The Court further held that under Rule 43 the security provided by a member should be subject to the paramount lien for any sum due to the Exchange or to the Clearing House, then, the Income Tax Department can recover its dues.
The Court in that regard rejected the submission of the appellant’s seeking to avoid any recovery by the Income Tax from the security transferred by him to the Stock Exchange on the ground that he had transferred the ownership of thing given in security to the Stock Exchange and the Stock exchange after clearing all debts should transfer back the assets to him or his representative, and consequently concluded that the said security still remained in the member’s ownership.


[1]  Civil Appeal No. 4354 of 2003, Decided On: 25.09.2014.
[2] 2001 (3) SCC 559.
[3] 2000 (5) SCC 694.
[4] 1967 (3) SCR 855.
[5] (1972) 42 Companies Case 359.
[6] Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, third edition, at page 1644.
[7] Palmer's Company Law, 21st edition, at page 765.

Saturday, 27 September 2014

Validity of Gift when the Donor keeps possession

Renikuntla Rajamma by LRs v. K. Sarwanamma [Civil Appeal No. 4195 OF 2008] Full Bench

I. Facts
The plaintiff (respondent in this appeal) sought a declaration that the revocation deed executed by the defendant-appellant revoking a gift deed earlier executed by her, was null and void. It is important to note that the donee defendant in the present case had reserved to herself during life, the right to enjoy the benefits arising from the suit property.
The Trial Court on the issue of gift deed being marred by fraud or undue influence found that the defendant had failed to prove such and also held that the deed was not a sham or nominal document. The gift, according to trial Court, had been validly made and accepted by the plaintiff, hence, irrevocable in nature. Moreover, since the donor had taken no steps to assail the gift made by her for more than 12 years, the same was voluntary in nature and free from any undue influence, mis-representation or suspicion. The fact that the donor had reserved the right to enjoy the property during her life time did not affect the validity of the deed, the trial Court opined.
The First Appellate Court affirmed the view taken by the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had satisfactorily proved the execution of a valid gift in his favour and that the revocation of a validly made gift deed was legally impermissible.
The Second Appellate Court, i.e., the High Court, also declined to interfere with the judgments and orders impugned before it and dismissed the second appeal of the appellant.

II. Issue
The only question which was urged on behalf of the appellant was whether retention of possession of the gifted property for enjoyment by the donor during her life time and the right to receive the rents of the property in any way affected the validity of the gift.

III. Relevant Provisions

§  S. 122. “Gift” defined- "Gift" is the transfer of certain existing movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donor, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Acceptance when to be made-Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.
§  S. 123. Transfer how effected – For the making of a gift of immoveable property, the transfer must be effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. For the purpose of making a gift of moveable property, the transfer may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as goods sold may be delivered.
§  S. 129. Saving of donations mortis causa and Muhammadan Law- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law or, save as provided by section 123, any rule of Hindu or Buddhist law”
Post 1929 Amendment
§  S. 129 Saving of donations mortis causa and Mohammedan Law- Nothing in this Chapter relates to gifts of moveable property made in contemplation of death, or shall be deemed to affect any rule of Mohammedan law.

IV. Contentions
§  IVa. Appellant's Contention
A conditional gift was not envisaged by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, so inasmuch as the gift deed failed to transfer, title, possession and the right to deal with the property in absolute terms in favour of the donee the same was no gift in the eyes of law. [Reiance being placed on Naramadaben Maganlal (supra).
§  IVb. Respondent's Contention
Placing reliance on K. Balakrishnan (supra), it was contended that gift which reserved a life interest for the donor could not be said to be invalid.

V. Judgment on the Issue
The Court adopted two different ways (Independent) to address the issue:

§  Va. Conjoint Reading of §§ 122 and 123 TPA and § 129 TPA
By doing so, the Court held that the “transfer of possession” of the property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act 1882.
The Court approved the decision of Constitution Bench of Allahabad High Court in Lallu Singh v. Gur Narain and Ors. [AIR 1922 All. 467], where the Court rejected the contention that § 123 of the T.P. Act merely added one more requirement of law namely requirement of attestation and registration of a gift deed to what was already required by the Hindu Law, i.e., making the delivery of possession absolutely essential for the completion of the gift.

§ 129 TPA: Both before and after 1929 Amendment
The Court held that a plain reading of the above made it manifest that the “rules of Hindu law” and “Buddhist Law” were to remain unaffected by Chapter VII except to the extent such rules were in conflict with § 123 of the TPA. This clearly implied that § 123 had an overriding effect on the rules of Hindu Law pertaining to gift including the rule that required possession of the property gifted to be given to the donee.
Post- amendment, the Hindu uncodified law relating to gifts apart from § 123, is now even superseded by the whole Chapter VII.

Supplementary Reasoning
§  Vb. Division of § 123 in Two Parts
The Court noted that while the first part dealing with immovable property mandatorily requires transfer by a registered instrument, the second part dealing with movable property requires that gift of movable property may be effected either by a registered instrument signed as aforesaid or “by delivery”.
Therefore, 'delivery' is not even a criteria in gifting a immovable property and not a mandatory criteria, rather is an alternative in gifting a movable property.

VI. Judgment on the Conflicting Decisions [Unclear Analysis by the Court]
It was found that there is an apparent conflict between Naramadaben Maganlal Thakker v. Pranjivandas Maganlal Thakker & Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 255 and K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 581, thus leading to this reference to a larger bench for an authoritative pronouncement as to the true and correct interpretation of Sections 122 and 123 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court distinguished the judgment in the case of Naramadaben Maganlal (supra) on the facts in that case, since it was a conditional gift and there was no recital of acceptance or any evidence in proof of acceptance on the part of the donee. However, it is submitted that the Court in the present case erred in not explaining why the Gift in Naramadaben case was a conditional gift, and not in the present case as the following recitals of the deed in Naramadaben case show that there the stipulations made on the gift deed were same as to be addressed by the present case, i.e., enjoyment of the property by the donor till his/her lifetime and right to receive rent. Apart from a clear finding of acceptance by the donee in the present case, the judgment in the Naramadaben case conflicts with the judgment in the present case.

In that case the donor that gifted the property stating:
"The said immovable property as described above with the ground floor and with the ways to pass and with the water disposal and with all other concerned rights, titles is gifted to you and the possession whereof is handed over to you under the following conditions to be observed by you and your heirs and legal representatives as long as the Sun and the Moon shine…that and you are made owners by the gift deed of the said property on such conditions that there are 15 rooms on the said property at present. I am rightful to receive the rents and the mesne profit whatsoever accrued from the said rooms throughout my life. I am only entitled to receive the mesne profit of the said property till I live. Similarly the said property shall be in my possession till I live…And by this gift deed the Limited ownership right will be conferred to you till I live. After my death you are entitled to transfer the said property. I shall not give in any way my right to anybody to collect the mesne profit. You may get transferred the said property in your name in support of this deed. This gift deed is executed to you under the aforesaid conditions."
Then, the deed was cancelled stating that:
"I executed to you a conditional gift deed of the said property from sky to earth. You had promised me to fulfill the oral conditions between us. But immediately after making the gift accordingly, you denied to fulfill the said conditions, The possession of the gifted property is not handed over to you. So in fact, you have not accepted the conditional gift of the property and I am also not willing to act according to the conditional gift."

The Court approved the judgment of K. Balakrishnan (supra), where the Court held had held that there is no prohibition in law that ownership in a property cannot be gifted without its possession and right of enjoyment.

VII. Conclusion
The Court, while approving the dictum that where the terms of a Statute or Ordinance are clear, then even a long and uniform course of judicial interpretation of it may be overruled, held that (i) whenever the donor is in absolute ownership of the property, (ii)
and transfers absolute title in the gift to the donee, (iii) which the donee accepts, and (iv) the acceptance of which is in the lifetime of donor, then, the mere fact of retaining the right to use the property during the lifetime of the donor, does not affect the transfer of ownership in the favor of the donee.

In the effect, if the donor does not give possession of the property to the donee till he/she is alive and even collects rents till his/her lifetime, such stipulations do not make the gift conditional. Therefore, it is a valid gift and consequently, the appeal was dismissed.