Thursday, 30 October 2014

Opinion: “Will the American Chicken Cross the Road”- Analysis of India’s Latest Non-compliance of the WTO Rules


Background

On October 14th, 2014 the WTO dispute panel ruled that India had violated the WTO rules by not allowing the US poultry and other farm products to be marketed in India due to unsubstantiated fears of bird flu.
While India argued that its action were backed by international laws on animal health, the panel didn't find any merit in the arguments and it agreed with the US that Indian actions were discriminatory in nature and were based on insufficient scientific evidence.
India further argued that several measures of Indian laws viz. Indian Livestock Act, 1898 and a number of other orders which are issued by department of animal husbandry of Government of Indiawould be violated if the US poultry products are allowed in India
On the other hand, US argued that by imposing the ban India acted inconsistently with inter alia Article 2 (because the measures were arbitrarily and unjustifiably discriminate between members where identical conditions prevail and are applied in a manner which constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade), Article 3 (because the measures were not based on relevant international standard) ,Article 5 (because they were not based on a scientific risk assessment and that the measures were more trade restrictive than required to achieve India's appropriate level of protection) of the SPS(Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary) agreement. SPS recognizes the right of the member states to make regulations to protect human, animal or plant health or life and also ensure at the same time that regulations must not be veiled form of protectionism.

In response India argued that its measures conformed to the international standard pursuant to Article 3.2 of the SPS agreement. Moreover it was argued that India was not obligated to provide scientific risk assessment report as its measure were based on scientific principles.

Analysis

This case did manage to stir up the debate about whether India used this ban as a thinly veiled protectionism and hence a political bargaining chip.The fact that the other developing nations like China, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Vietnam etc. became third parties in the case brings to the fore one question: Do import bans by developing countries against the products from developed countries reflect the succumbing to domestic political pressures or something more.
This judgment puts the policy ball clearly in India's court as it remains to be seen how India responds to such arguments. Either it can change the measures to comply with the WTO rules within a reasonable period of time or it has the option to appeal in 60 days under the WTO rules.
  

Monday, 20 October 2014

Opinion: Leader of Opposition and Case Laws and Directions of Speaker in 1956- Part II


The Present Part of the Post deals with the Case Laws, Constitutional Assembly Debates and The Much Cited Directions of the Speaker in 1956 (famously the ‘Malvankar Rule’)

The post is a brief part of the paper published in Economic and Political Weekly, Volume 49, Issue 37, 2014 (September 13) accessible at http://www.epw.in/commentary/10-rule-and-lop.html. with an addition of addressing the Speaker's directions 120 and 121 made in 1956.

Some Relevant Cases on the Issue of Leader of Opposition in High Courts
In the case of AK Subbaih v. Karnataka Legislature Secretariat,[1] the Karnataka High Court held that convention of having a leader of opposition whose party has secured minimum 1/10th of the effective strength of the House, is for the House to continue to adhere to or depart from it and the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain any petition regarding this issue.[2] In the case of the Kailash Nath Singh v. Speaker,[3] the Allahabad High Court opined that even in the absence of the any guideline on how to accord the recognition to member as a leader of the opposition, it must be done as per the prevailing practice and convention. In this case, petitioner was selected to be the leader of opposition when his party secured 92 seats. But due to a split in the party, two groups were formed, where the group with more number of members voted for respondent no. 2 to be selected as the leader of the opposition. The Speaker recognized the respondent no. 2 to be the new leader of opposition. The Court held that the principle adopted by the Speaker that the party in opposition with the largest numerical strength can chose a leader of opposition, was consistently followed by him when the recognized the petitioner and then respondent no. 2 as leader of oppositions and hence the speaker acted within his jurisdiction.
The Patna High Court was presented with the issue as to whether there is requirement of 10% rule. § 2 of the Bihar Legislature (Leaders of Opposition Salary and Allowances) Act 1977 that required for a person to be leader of opposition to be (i) leader of a party having the greatest numerical strength, and (ii) be recognised as such by the Speaker. The Court held that if the Speaker recognises any person who is the leader of a party in opposition having greatest numerical strength as the leader of opposition, he is doing so on the basis of the practice prevailing and, therefore, has to follow the other requirements of such practice and convention, since there is no provision in the Act which enjoins the Speaker to recognise the leader of a party having the greatest numerical strength, to be the leader of opposition.[4]
Constitutional Debates on Requirement of Leader of Opposition
During the Constitutional Assembly Debates one Mr. Z.H. Lari proposed an amendment to Draft Article 86, which dealt with the allowances to the members of legislatures after the commencement of the constitution, that the Leader of the Opposition should be entitled to get salary payable to a Minister without Cabinet rank.[5]The speaker had highlighted the importance of the leader of the Opposition, that such person shall make the party government realize that they have to face public opinion whenever they take policy and administrative decisions by contending the opposing views and the amendment moved must be crystallized in the constitution to erode the psychological impression that there is only one party rule.
No member whether it spoke for or against the amendment argued that there is no need of opposition. In fact, the reason why the amendment was not accepted is because (i) the opposers[6] thought that merely recognizing the ‘leader of opposition’ does not mean that it shall be able to organize a party on its own, (ii) there is no embargo on the Parliament in future to provide for salary to the leader of opposition and recognize a leader of opposition, if it deems it fit to do so in future.[7]
It is clear that objection (i) does not imagine the situation where the leader of opposition is selected from a party in minority in the assembly (which is the current practice), rather it thinks of a leader of opposition being recognized firstly, then, that leader would organize a party in opposition and objection (ii) is upheld by the enactment of the Act 1977.

Malvankar Rule and its Binding Value
There has been much citing here of the directions 120 and 121 framed by the speaker GV Mavlankar in 1956 to hold the binding value of 10 % requirement for the post of leader of opposition. Apart from the fact that post- these directions there is an express statute in context of Leader of Oppositions in 1977, not expressly crystallizing the 10% requirement, after the addition of Tenth Schedule and since the 11th Lok Sabha, there is no need of speaker’s recognition of parliamentary parties and groups since that was accorded on the basis of an ascertained minimum strength in the Parliament.[8] So, it is submitted that now the directions of 120 and 121 are not in practice and any party with even a single MP can be a parliamentary party in the Parliament.

                                                                   Conclusion
It is submitted that the decisions of the High Court would not be helpful since in the (i) Subbaiah case no provision was produced, while the (ii) Kailash Nath case had a provision that had defined the Leader of opposition as the Member of the Assembly who is for the time being recognized as such by the Speaker but did not provide for any other criteria for according such recognition, (para 17 of the case) and (iii) Kapoori case, it is submitted that (a) if the speaker is allowed the power to recognize, then it can not allow leader of opposition to be selected even if the largest minority has more 10% seats and (b) allowing such power to speaker to be exercised undermines the qualification of maximum minority, so that even if the party is the largest minority it still cannot be recognized. In my view, the recognition of speaker is only to put an official authorization to the selection of the leader of the opposition and as seen in the debates to the Constituent Assembly, where no one objected to there being a leader of opposition but preferred that the Parliament can provide for Salaries to them in future. So, the Act 1977 cannot be meant to only provide for salaries and not recognize the requirement for a leader of opposition.




[1] ILR 1993 Karnataka 1137. (Full Bench)
[2] Ibid, ¶¶ 4, 5.
[3] AIR 1993 All 334.
[4] Karpoori Thakur v. State of Bihar and Anr., AIR 1983 Pat 86, ¶ 11.
[5] Constitutional Assembly Debates, Vol VIII, Friday, the 20th May 1949
http://164.100.47.132/LssNew/constituent/vol8p5.html, accessed on 28th May 2014 at 9:54 AM.
[6] Shri T.T. Krishnamachari, Dr. Ambedkar and Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.
[7] Constitutional Assembly Debates, Vol VIII, Friday, the 20th May 1949.
[8] Kaul and Shakdher, “Practice and Procedure of Parliament, 6th edn., 2008, p. 386.

Friday, 17 October 2014

Priority of Lien Holder's claims as against the Dues to Income Tax Authorities over the proceeds from the security deposited

The Stock Exchange v. V.S. Kandalgaonkar[1] [Full Bench]

Background of the Case
The case pertains to the Income Tax Authorities’ right to recover its dues from an assessee (defaulter declared by the Stock Exchange) by having a first claim over the amount realized by the Stock Exchange at the auction of the Membership Card of such defaulter.

I. Contentions
Ø  Appellant’s Contentions
§  That the membership card is only a personal privilege granted to a member that cannot be attached by the Income Tax Department at any stage. The moment a member is declared a defaulter all rights qua the membership card of the member cease and even his right of nomination vests in the Stock Exchange.
§  That a conjoint reading of Rules 38 with 44 of the Rules made by the Stock Exchange shows that the security in form of shares that are given by a member is transferred and held either in the name of the trustees of the Stock Exchange or in the name of a Bank which is approved by the Governing Board. Therefore, the member is no longer an owner, consequently the Income Tax Department cannot lay hands on these shares or its sale proceeds as the member ceases to have ownership rights of these shares.
§  That by virtue of Rule 43, the Stock Exchange has a first and paramount lien for any sum due to it, and that this made it a secured creditor so that in any case income tax dues would not to be given preference over dues to secured creditors.

Ø  Respondent’s Contentions
§  That the High Court’s reasoning is correct where it had held that though a defaulting member had no interest in a membership card and that the Income Tax Department was not right in attaching the sale proceeds of such card, still money which is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee, that is the Bombay Stock Exchange, for and on behalf of the Assessee is attachable because the requisite condition is the subsistence of an ascertained debt in the hands of the garnishee which is due to the Assessee, or the existence of a contractual relationship between the Assessee and the Stock Exchange consequent upon which money is likely to come in the hands of the garnishee for and on behalf of the Assessee
§  That a conjoint reading of rules made by the Stock Exchange makes it clear the expression “transferred” would not refer to transfer of ownership but would refer only to the delivery made of shares for the purpose of realization in case a member defaults.
§  That the mere fact that a lien was provided in the Rules did not make such lien a statutory lien and that therefore Government dues would have a first preference over all the dues of the Stock Exchange.



II. Relevant Provisions
Ø  Income Tax Act

§  Section 226 3 (i) The assessing officer or tax recovery officer may, at any time or from time to time, by notice in writing require any person from whom money is due or may become due to the Assessee or any person who holds or may subsequently hold money for or on account of the Assessee, to pay the assessing officer or tax recovery officer either forthwith upon the money becoming due or being held or at or within the time specified in the notice (not being before the money becomes due or is held) so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the amount due by the Assessee in respect of arrears or the whole of the money when it is equal to or less than that amount:
§  Rule 26 of Schedule II of the Income Tax Act then provides Debts and Shares, etc. - (1) In case of
(a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument… c) other movable property not in the possession of the defaulter…the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting, (i) in the case of the debt - the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the tax recovery officer…(iii) in the case of the other movable property (except as aforesaid) - the person in possession of the same from giving it over to the defaulter.


Ø  Securities Regulation Act, 1956

§  Section 9. Power of recognised stock exchanges to make bye-law(1) Any recognised stock exchange may, subject to the previous approval of the Securities and Exchange Board of India, make bye-laws for the Regulation and control of contracts.


Ø  Rules made by the Stock Exchange

§  Rule 5. Membership a Personal Privilege- The membership shall constitute a personal permission from the Exchange to exercise the rights and privileges attached thereto subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange.
§  Rule 7. Right of Nomination- Subject to the provisions of these Rules a member shall have the right of nomination, which shall be personal and non-transferable.
§  Rule 9. Right of Nomination of Deceased or Defaulter Member- On the death or default of a member his right of nomination shall cease and vest in the Exchange.
§  Rule 10. Forfeited or Lapsed Right of Membership- When a right of membership is forfeited to or vests in the Exchange under any Rule, Bye-law or Regulation of the Exchange for the time being in force it shall belong absolutely to the Exchange free of all rights, claims or interest of such member or any person claiming through such member and the Governing Board shall be entitled to deal with or dispose of such right of membership as it may think fit.
§  Rule 16. Allocation in Order of Priority- When as provided in these Rules the Governing Board has exercised the right of nomination in respect of a membership vesting in the Exchange the consideration received therefore shall be applied to the following purposes and in the following order of priority namely-…(iii) the payment of the surplus if any to the funds of the Exchange: provided that the Exchange in general meeting may at its absolute discretion direct that such surplus be disposed of or applied in such other manner as it may deem fit.
§  Rule 37. Form of Security- The security to be furnished by a member shall be provided either by a deposit of cash or it may be provided in the form of a Deposit Receipt of a Bank approved by the Governing Board or in Securities approved by the Governing Board subject to such terms and conditions as the Governing Board may from time to time impose…
§  Rule 38. Security How HeldDeposits of cash shall be lodged in a Bank approved by the Governing Board and Bank Deposit Receipts and securities shall be transferred to and held either in the names of the Trustees of the Exchange or in the name of a Bank approved by the Governing Board and lodged with a Bank approved by the Governing Board. Such deposit shall be entirely at the risk of the member providing the security but it shall be held by the Bank solely for and on account of the Exchange at the absolute discretion of the Exchange without any right whatever on the part of such member or those in his right to call in question, the exercise of such discretion.
§  Rule 41. Change of Security- A member may withdraw any security provided by him if he first provides in lieu thereof other security of sufficient value to the satisfaction of the Governing Board.
§  Rule 43. Lien on Security- The security provided by a member shall be subject to a first and paramount lien for any sum due to the Exchange or to the Clearing House by him or by the partnership of which he may be a member and for the due fulfillment of his engagements, obligations and liabilities or of the partnership of which he may be a member arising out of or incidental to any bargains, dealings, transactions and contracts made subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange or anything done in pursuance thereof.
§  Rule 44Return of Security- On the termination of his membership or on his ceasing to carry on business on the Exchange or on his working as a representative member or on his death all security not applied under the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange shall at the cost of the member be repaid and transferred either to him or as he shall direct or in the absence of such direction to his legal representatives.

Ø  Bye- Laws made by the Stock Exchange

§  Rule 326Defaulter’s Assets- The Defaulters’ Committee shall call in and realise the security and margin money and securities deposited by the defaulter and recover all monies, securities and other assets due, payable or deliverable to the defaulter by any other member in respect of any transaction or dealing made subject to the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange and such assets shall vest in the Defaulters’ Committee for the benefit and on account of the creditor members.

III. Issues
1.     Whether the membership card is a privilege or a right for the defaulting member.
2.     Whether in the Chapter entitled ‘Membership Security’, the phrase “securities shall be transferred to and held” in Rule 38, means a mere transfer of possession of security or transfer of ownership of security. In other words, whether the security furnished by the member (in form of shares in the present case), remains in his/her ownership or the ownership rests with the person keeping the ownership.
3.     Whether the government debts have precedence over secured creditors.
4.     What is the nature of the lien under rule 43, i.e., whether it is a statutory lien or a lien under an agreement of furnishing a security.
5.     Whether the lien under Rule 43 makes make the Stock Exchange a secured creditor.


IV. Judgment on the Issues

On Issue 1
The Court held that a conjoint reading of Rules 5 and 9 leads to the conclusion that a membership card is only a personal permission from the Stock Exchange to exercise rights and privileges, which can be taken away along with the right of nomination from the defaulting member. The Court here distinguished between any accrued right to that of any privilege. In its opinion, the member only had a privilege and not an accrued right to property. The Court, by relying on the Ahmedabad Stock Exchange case[2] where it had held that the membership under the above mentioned rules is merely a personal privilege granted to a member and is non- transferrable and incapable of alienation by the member and concluded that once a right of nomination vests in the Stock Exchange under the Rules, that right belongs to the Stock Exchange absolutely.
The Court also noticed that whenever under Rule 16 (iii) the Governing Board exercises the right of nomination in respect of a membership which vests in the Exchange, the ultimate surplus that may remain after the membership card is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange - it does not go to the member. This shows that the member does not have any right to property.

On Issue 2
The Court construed the expression “securities shall be transferred to and held” so as to be providing only for transfer by delivery of security to the Stock Exchange, while the ownership still remains with the member. For that it noted, amongst other reasons, that (i) the expression “transferred” must take colour from the expression “lodged” in Rule 38 when it came to deposits of cash. So, when understood in this sense, transfer only means delivery for the purposes of holding such shares as securities, (ii) the language employed in Rule 38 states “such deposit shall be entirely at the risk of the member providing the security…”, which shows that the deposit of cash or security is entirely at the risk of the member who provides the security. Thus, making it clear that such member continues to be the owner of the said shares by way of security for otherwise they cannot possibly be at the member’s risk, (iii) Rule 41 allows a member to withdraw any security provided by him if he satisfies the conditions of the Rules, (iv) Rule 43 provides for a lien on securities to the Stock Exchange. Such a lien is only compatible with the member being owner of the security, for otherwise no question arises if the Stock exchange (as contended by ld. Counsel for appellants) is the owner of the security.

On Issue 3
The Court while noting that the Income Tax Act itself does not provide for any paramountcy of dues by way of income tax, cited with approval the judgment in the case of Dena Bank v. Bhikabhai Prabhudas Parekh Co,[3] where it was held that the common law of England or the principles of equity and good conscience (as applicable to India) do not accord the Crown a preferential right for recovery of its debts over a mortgagee or pledgee of goods or a secured creditor. Here, Article 372 of the Constitution of India is relevant where the common law of England qua Crown debts becomes applicable to our jurisdiction. In fact, in the case of Collector of Aurangabad and Anr v. Central Bank of India and Anr[4] the Court held that the claim of the Government to priority for arrears of income tax dues stems from the English common law doctrine of priority of Crown debts and has been given judicial recognition in British India prior to 1950 and was therefore “law in force” in the territory of India before the Constitution and was continued by Article 372 of the Constitution. However, such right of priority of Government dues only extends to priority over unsecured debts.

On Issue 4
The Court chose not to address the issue of whether the lien provided under the Rule 43 made by the Stock Exchange is a statutory lien or a lien under an agreement. Therefore, the Contention (iii) of the respondent’s was not relevant. The Court stated that the precedents cited by the respondent’s counsel for the proposition that the statutory lien is a paramount lien only which can override the claims of all other creditors including secured creditors, is not in issue in the present case. Since, to overrule the Income Tax Department’s decision of claiming priority of Government debt over the Stock Exchange’s claims, would only require to prove that the Stock Exchange’s claims make it a secured creditor.

On Issue 5
The Court here referred to the judgment in the case of K.S. Saradambal v. Jagannatham K Brothers[5], where on a consideration of Section 529 of the Companies Act 1956 read with the relevant provisions of the insolvency law, came to the conclusion that the holder of a statutory lien or the holder of a lien created by contract and registered as required by Section 125 is a secured creditor in the matter of winding up of the insolvent company with regard to, among other things, debts provable in the winding up proceedings.
Explaining the meaning of the term ‘lien’ which is the right to retain possession of a thing until a claim be satisfied which is either particular or general,[6] the Court noted that a secured creditor is one, who has some mortgage, charge or lien on the company’s property. Therefore, a solicitor who holds a lien on documents of a liquidating company for his costs against the company is a secured creditor, and must mention his lien in his proof.[7]
Therefore, the Court concluded that the Stock Exchange being the one holding a lien (irrespective of the fact whether it is a statutory lien or lien by agreement) is a secured creditor and consequently has higher claim over the government’s debts.

V. Conclusion
So, the Court has held that the TRO was not right in attaching the sale proceeds of the nomination rights of the Defaulter-Member’s membership card as the ownership of such nomination rights and the membership card were on default vested in the Stock Exchange and not the defaulter. Since, the membership rights were only a privilege and can be taken away, there was no accrued right to the member. Also, the surplus that may remain after the membership card is sold by the Exchange comes only to the Exchange and does not go to the member as per Rule 16 (iii).

The Court further held that under Rule 43 the security provided by a member should be subject to the paramount lien for any sum due to the Exchange or to the Clearing House, then, the Income Tax Department can recover its dues.
The Court in that regard rejected the submission of the appellant’s seeking to avoid any recovery by the Income Tax from the security transferred by him to the Stock Exchange on the ground that he had transferred the ownership of thing given in security to the Stock Exchange and the Stock exchange after clearing all debts should transfer back the assets to him or his representative, and consequently concluded that the said security still remained in the member’s ownership.


[1]  Civil Appeal No. 4354 of 2003, Decided On: 25.09.2014.
[2] 2001 (3) SCC 559.
[3] 2000 (5) SCC 694.
[4] 1967 (3) SCR 855.
[5] (1972) 42 Companies Case 359.
[6] Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, third edition, at page 1644.
[7] Palmer's Company Law, 21st edition, at page 765.