Tuesday, 30 December 2014

Filing of Bail Applications Successively- Curbing Forum Shopping


Recently, the Supreme Court had given an important ruling intending to curb the practice of forum shopping amongst lawyers, where they would after getting a bail application rejected/accepted from one judge, the aggrieved party (can be accused or prosecutor or complainant) would again file a similar bail application before another judge.

I. Facts of the Case
The appellants had earlier moved an application u/§ 438 CrPC for grant of anticipatory bail which was dismissed by one judge. Thereafter, the appellants after expiry of three weeks filed 2nd application u/§ 438 Cr.PC which came to be considered by another judge, while the earlier judge who had decided the previous bail application was still available.

II. Decision in the Case
The Court categorically stated that such practice was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by Courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary.
Therefore, the Judge who has declined to entertain the prayer for grant of bail, if available, should hear the second bail application or the successive bail applications, as such practice is in consonance with the principle of judicial decorum, discipline and propriety.
Here, it is important to note that the acceptance of 2nd bail application by another judge, i.e., when the 1st application has been rejected by a different judge, “is a bail order passed in a perverse manner excluding the relevant matters”. Such ground of cancellation of bail order is different from the cancellation of the order of bail because of violation of the terms and conditions of the order granting bail and other supervening circumstances.
However, an obvious exception is provided in cases where a Judge has demitted the office or has been transferred. In such cases, the earlier judge was obviously “not available”.

III. Conclusion

It is obvious that the phrase “not available” can be construed to include where judges are on holidays. Though such cases are bound to happen, the judgment, however, is a welcome reminder for the lower Courts to uphold the judicial discipline of respecting one judge’s opinion and introduce a modicum of certainty in the decision making.

Monday, 29 December 2014

Undue Enrichment vis-a-vis Unjust Recovery: Article 14 Obligation


Recently, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether employees that were in receipt of monetary benefits beyond their due, should be exempted in law, from the reimbursement of the same to the employer. An important factual scenario that is required to be noted is that the employees were no guilty of furnishing any incorrect information, which had led the concerned competent authority, to commit the mistake of making the higher payment to the employees.
The issue has its own inherent difficulty in the sense that there is a Right to Recovery of the employer as against the effect on the employee who had been in good faith, enjoying the excess amount received by him/her.

I. Precedents Involved
(i) Shyam Babu Verma and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 521;
(ii) Sahib Ram Verma vs. State of Haryana (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 18;
(iii) Chandi Prasad Uniyal and Ors. vs. State of Uttarakhand & Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 417;
(iv) Syed Abdul Qadir v. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 475;
(v) Col. B.J. Akkara v. Government of India, (2006) 11 SCC 709.

II. Decision of the Court
The Court in para 8 reasoned that the right to recover being pursued by the employer, will have to be compared, with the effect of the recovery on the concerned employee. It held that in case, the effect of the recovery from the concerned employee would be more unfair/more wrongful/more improper/more unwarranted, than the corresponding right of the employer to recover the amount, then it would be iniquitous and arbitrary, to effect the recovery.
The Court invoked Article 14 and DPSPs u/Arts 38, 39, 39A, 43 and 46 to reason that equity and good conscience, in the matter of livelihood of the people of this country, has to be the basis of all governmental actions. Otherwise, the said action is Arbitrary and consequently violative of Article 14.

III. Instances where Right to Recovery is Unconstitutional
The Court was presented with precedents of the Supreme Court itself, where by exercising its extra- ordinary power under Article 142 to pass equitable orders in the ends of justice, it had previously ordered non- recoverability of excess amount. The Court used these judgments to lay down certain instances, where recovery will not be allowed, since such recovery would be iniquitious or have a harsh and arbitrary effect on the employee and consequently violative of Article 14:
(i) If the excess payment had been made for a long duration of time, i.e., more than 5 years, it would be iniquitous to make any recovery. (because it would be almost impossible for an employee to bear the financial burden, of a refund of payment received wrongfully for a long span of time);
(ii) Recovery from employees in lower rung of service, i.e., Class-III and Class-IV – sometimes denoted as Group ‘C’ and Group ‘D’. (because employees in lower rung of service would spend their entire earnings in the upkeep and welfare of their family, and if such excess payment is allowed to be recovered from them, it would cause them far more hardship, than the reciprocal gains to the employer);
(iii) Recovery of excess payments, made from employees who have retired from service, or
are close to their retirement. (because it would entail extremely harsh consequences outweighing the monetary gains by the employer as a retired employee or an employee about to retire, is a class apart from those who have sufficient service to their credit, before their retirement. Also, at this stage an employee is past his youth, his needs are far in excess of what they were when he was younger and his earnings have substantially dwindled on retirement);
(iv) Where employees were entitled to wages, for the post against which they had discharged their duties, even if the concerned appellants were ineligible for the same post. But the mistake of employing on that post must be of someone else and the employee should not have contributed to that mistake; or
(v) where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer’s right to recover.

IV. Conclusion
The Court through its reasoning, in cases where the employer is ‘State’ has termed such recovery to be violative of Article 14, but still it has allowed the doors open where the employer is a ‘private person’. In latter cases, equity still can be invoked to have the Court exercise its discretion in employee’s favor.

IVa. Law of Unjust Enrichment
The law of recovery in cases of “unjust enrichment” is based on law of restitution in cases where there is neither any consent or wrongdoing issue. Such action is based neither on contract nor on tort, hence it falls in a third category i.e. of restitution. The law is clear on this issue Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Limited[1] where it was held:
The claim for money had and received is not… founded upon any wrong committed by the club against the solicitors. But it does not, in my opinion, follow that the court has carte blanche to reject the solicitors' claim simply because it thinks it unfair or unjust in the circumstances to grant recovery. The recovery of money in restitution is not, as a general rule, a matter of discretion for the court. A claim to recover money at common law is made as a matter of right; and even though the underlying principle of recovery is the principle of unjust enrichment, nevertheless, where recovery is denied, it is denied on the basis of legal principle. [emphasis added] [example defence of change of position].
The position in India seems to be a bit changed, allowing for huge scope for judicial discretion in interpreting when would the ‘recovery be unjust’, rather than simply analyzing the defences available to such restitution:
Unjust enrichment” has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust.[2]
This position may cause a reader to erroneously mix two different aspects, one what is unjust enrichment and second when is recovery unjust. Right to recovery flows from unjust enrichment, but such recovery may be unjust if an employee has been innocently getting such sum for say 20 years. The law is that recovery can be stopped only when one of the defences is applicable, otherwise there is a Right to have recovery. The Indian Courts have in such cases used equity principles to refuse such recovery, though the Right to Recover due to unjust enrichment is still there. In my opinion, what is not allowed is the enforcement of the Right because allowing Right to Recover from a person unjustly enriched, would be more unjust to the employee as compared to how unjust it was to the employer when he gave the excess amount to the employee.

IVb. Present Decision and its Impact.
The Court here used Article 14 and not resorted to the invocation of jurisdiction in equity which had earlier been used to do so by the precedents cited in the present case.
Therefore, the decision seems to be sound in the sense that it uses the fundamental rights of State employees against the State employer’s Right to recover, consequently avoided any scope of using equity jurisdiction, which could have the adverse effect of twisting the law of Unjust Enrichment by subjecting the private employers’ Right to the recover given under the common law, to the law of equity and consequently to vast discretion of the Courts. The decision has given a Constitutional basis to reject the claim of recovery, though under the guise of judicial discretion to check whether the recovery would be unjust.





[1] [1991] 3 WLR 10 (House of Lords).
[2] Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. UOI, accessible at http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1356184/.

Sunday, 28 December 2014

Ownership of Employer over Employee's Patents: An Analysis of Darius Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Limited, Keki Hormusji Gharda& Ors.

Two weeks ago, Bombay High Court in the case of Darius Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Limited, Keki Hormusji Gharda & Ors. decided on the issue of ownership of employer over inventions of employee. The Court held that the test is whether there is any such clause in the employment contract regarding transfer of ownership over invention devised by the employee or whether the invention was devised in the course of employment. The Court also discussed the use of employer’s funds in devising the invention. However, it did not clarify what role of such "use of funds" would be in the transfer of ownership.

 Following are the submissions made by the plaintiff (shareholder of Company) and the defendant (Managing Director of Company). Plaintiff, here, is challenging the patents registered in the name of defendants that they should have been registered in the name of the Company.

 Plaintiff’s Arguments:

§   Defendant used the R&D facility, support and R&D team of the Company and therefore the, any patent, obtained and/or applied for should be in the name of the Company.
§   Arguendo, in view of the fiduciary duty, being the managing director, the patents should be registered in the name of Company only.
§   Company incurred expenses regarding the impugned Patents.
§   Section 88 of Indian Trust Act requires the Defendant to hold for the benefit of the company the advantage (interest in the patents) that he has himself gained.
§   In the whole time employment of the Company, Defendant is obligated and devoted his whole time exclusively for the benefit of the Company alone.
§   Also, the fiduciary duty of the Defendant enjoins Defendant to exclusively work for the Company and not to compete with or divert the business or assets of the Company.

Defendant’s Arguments:

§  Defendant firstly challenged the locus of plaintiff. The post is not concerned about these arguments. The arguments are discussed here and here.
§  Patents are individual creation of the defendant, hence should be registered in his name only.
§  Though Defendant owes a fiduciary duty, but this does not follow that patent devised by him in his individual capacity should belong to the Company or that he should hold them in trust for the Company.
§  The expenditure on the impugned patents by the Company has not been for making or for granting these patented process for products but only to fine tune how economically the Defendant can use the patents.
§  There is no provision in law which provides that the employee generated patent should belong to the employer.
§  Defendant is appointed as the Managing Director of the Company, he is only entrusted with powers of management and he is not required to do any research and development or make inventions.
§  If it is held that the patent was wrongfully obtained by Defendant rather than in the name of Company, then any person including the competitors of the Company may apply for revocation/cancellation of the patent under Section 64(1)(b) of the Patents Act and this can never be in the interest of company.

 Determination by the Court:

§  The Court firstly decided the maintainability of derivative action in favour of Defendant. 
§  Fiduciary duty violation: The test is whether Defendant, as Managing Director, had a duty to invent. On perusal of Managing Director Contract, there is not even an iota of indication either expressly or by implication that Defendant was also required to devise inventions.
§  Defendant did not create the inventions in the course of his employment. Also, he did not have a duty to create the inventions. For these reasons, Section 88 of Indian Trust Act is not applicable.
§  With respect to R&D funds of Company, the Court accepted the submissions of the Defendant.

Sections 8 and 11 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, and Res Judicata

Recently, a division bench of Supreme Court in Anil & Ors. v. Rajendra & Ors. delivered an important ruling regarding Chief Justice’s power to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6). It was held that once the trial court has declined to refer the matter for arbitration under Section 8, the Chief Justice is barred to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) as the earlier determination by the trial court acts as res judicataWith this, the Court set aside the order of High Court which affirmed the appointment made by CJ under Section 11(6). The reasoning of High Court was that Section 8(3) does preclude appointment of arbitrator during the course of litigation pursuant to the agreement.
Ironically, a higher judicial authority is made bound by determination of a lower judicial authority by the judgement. The same disapproval was faced by judgement of Supreme Court in SBP v. Patel Engg. Further, the Court remained silent as to what would have been appropriate remedy against such order of non-reference to arbitration under Section 8. Apparently, the applicant would approach an appellate authority. Had the Court allowed CJ to assume jurisdiction under Section 11(6), res judicata would have played out for such appellate authority. However, such a determination would require a doubtful assumption that CJ may act as an appellate authority under Section 11(6). Yet this route would clearly save the parties from the vice of the pro-longed litigation in Civil Courts.

Saturday, 20 December 2014

Maintenance to Working Wife: The Dichotomy of “Saying” and “Doing”

Maintenance to a Hindu wife is provided under Hindu Marriage Act, Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, Cr.P.C. etc. Under these legislations, there is no fixed limit as to the quantum of maintenance. Under Cr.P.C., the limit of Rs. 1500/- was removed by the Central Amendment. Thus, currently, the magistrate or other relevant judicial authority has the discretion to award proper and necessary amount of maintenance as per the facts and circumstances of a case.
However, to restrict the above discretion, Supreme Court has evolved the test of “status of family” that “the wife should be in a position to maintain standard of living that is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family.”[1] In this test various factors such as earning capacity of both the husband and wife, current and prospective earnings of both husband and wife, number of children and expenses incurred and to be incurred upon, etc. are taken into consideration.
Ironically, the judiciary has disregarded the test when the working wife is claiming maintenance. In such cases, the Court sees whether the working wife is able to earn enough to live her life irrespective of the fact that she is not enjoying status of family that she enjoyed with her husband. For example, recently, Delhi HC rejected claim for maintenance by wife who earns 80,000/- per month, though 80,000/- is not sufficient to maintain her earlier strata.
In the above observation, the question is not whether the earning wife should get maintenance when her income is enough to live a life better than that of a destitute. Rather the issue is about the trend of judiciary that what the judiciary sets as ‘law’ has not been properly followed even by the judiciary itself. Nonetheless, the trend is a significant step forward in dealings with short-term marriages.


[1]Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai, AIR 2008 SC 530 (Justices Arijit Pasayat and Aftab Alam)